윤강로의 스포츠세상 - Rocky YOON's Sport World

[독일 Munich, 올림픽 법 추진으로 프로젝트 신속화 모색(Munich seeks Olympic law to fast-track projects)]

10월22일자 외신기사내용 정리하여 공유합니다.

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바이에른 주정부는 이번 주, 2036년 올림픽 유치를 위한 뮌헨의 계획 승인과 인프라 프로젝트를 신속히 진행할 수 있도록 입법 조치를 추진하겠다고 발표했습니다. 다만, 뮌헨은 아직 대회 개최권을 확보하지 못한 상태입니다(The Bavarian government announced this week that it would pursue legislative measures to speed up planning approvals and infrastructure projects needed for the capital's bid to host the 2036 Games, although the city has yet to secure the right to stage them)

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이는 바이에른 주정부가 2036 올림픽 유치 준비를 위해 행정·건설 절차를 간소화하는 특별법 제정을 추진하고 있다는 내용입니다.

[뮌헨, 올림픽 법 추진]

-바이에른 주정부, 2036 올림픽 유치 준비를 위한 인프라·건설 프로젝트 신속화 법안 추진 발표.

-마르쿠스 죄더(Markus Söder) 주총리와 도미니크 크라우제(Dominik Krause) 뮌헨 시장이 공동 발표.

-목표: 2029년까지 건설 준비 완료, 행정 절차 간소화, 소송 절차 단축.

[법적·행정 과제]

-주정부 권한만으로는 부족 → 연방정부에도 유사 법안 도입 요청.

-건설 계약 입찰 절차도 신속화 계획.

-IOC는 2029년에 2036 개최지를 선정 예정 → 시간 압박 존재.

[주요 인프라 난관]

-S-반(도심 철도) 2번째 본선 라인: 2035~2037년 완공 예상.

-새 중앙역 건물: 그 이후 완공 전망.

-U4 지하철 연장, 다글핑 올림픽 빌리지 연결 트램, U9 신규 노선 등도 계획 단계.

-공항 연결 장거리 철도 서비스 일정 불확실.

[재정·정치 협력]

-시·주·연방정부 및 스포츠 단체 간 재정 분담·정책 조율 필요.

-크라우제 시장: 내년 봄까지 재정 보증·법적 틀 명확화 필요.

-죄더: 교통 인프라 비용을 뮌헨에만 부담시키지 않겠다고 약속.

-입찰 비용: 약 €1,800만~€2,000만.

[환경 논란]

-NOlympia 캠페인: 신규 지하철 노선 CO₂ 배출 → 2035년 기후중립목표 위협.

-다글핑 올림픽 빌리지 건설 → 이탄지·농지 훼손 우려.

[여론과 준비]

-2025년 주민투표에서 66.4% 찬성 확보.

-기존 1972년 올림픽경기장 재사용, 단일 선수촌 계획.

-2027년 3월 IOC가 후보 도시를 선정하면, 뮌헨은 유치 관리 회사 설립 예정.

요약하면, 뮌헨은 2036 올림픽 유치 경쟁에서 앞서가기 위해 법적·행정 절차를 신속화하는 특별법을 추진 중이나, 철도·교통 인프라 지연, 환경 논란, 재정 협력 문제가 주요 과제로 남아 있습니다.

원문에 나온 “Bavarian government”은 독일의 바이에른 주정부를 의미합니다.

-Bavaria는 독일 남부의 주(州) 이름으로, 독일어로 Bayern이라고 합니다.

-따라서 “Bavarian government”는 “바이에른 주정부”입니다.

즉, 기사 속 표현은 Bavarian = 바이에른을 가리키며, 올림픽 유치 관련 법안을 추진하는 주체가 바로 바이에른 주정부라는 뜻입니다.

[Munich seeks Olympic law to fast-track projects]

The Bavarian government announced this week that it would pursue legislative measures to speed up planning approvals and infrastructure projects needed for the capital's bid to host the 2036 Games, although the city has yet to secure the right to stage them.

Bavarian Minister-President Markus Söder presented the initiative alongside Munich Mayor Dominik Krause at City Hall on Monday, with the aim of simplifying planning regulations and construction procedures as much as possible so that projects are ready for construction by 2029 at the latest. "We will simplify building regulations and planning requirements as much as possible and speed up the procedures so that Olympic projects are ready for construction by 2029 and investment can get under way quickly," Söder said.

The proposal has yet to become law, and the regional government believes that its own powers will not be sufficient. Söder called on the federal government to introduce similar legislation to reduce administrative hurdles and shorten legal proceedings related to the projects. "Legal proceedings must also be speeded up for the Olympics to avoid endless stages of litigation," he said, according to the German news agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur. The plan also includes speeding up the awarding of construction contracts, although the provisions of the proposed Bavarian law have yet to be finalised and equivalent federal legislation remains a proposal put forward by Söder.

The urgency stems from the timetable set by the International Olympic Committee, which plans to select the host of the 2036 Games in 2029, the earliest of three editions Germany is targeting, alongside 2040 and 2044. The German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB) selected Munich to represent the country on 26 September, after the city's bid prevailed over rival proposals at national level, but the city must still compete against bids from other countries to secure the right to stage the Games. Söder therefore believes it is necessary to prepare the infrastructure for 2036, even though there is no guarantee that the event will take place there.

The timetables for major railway projects present one of the main obstacles to being ready for the 2036 Games. A motion tabled last week by Social Democratic lawmakers in the Bavarian parliament warned that the second main line of Munich's S-Bahn suburban rail network would not enter service until sometime between 2035 and 2037, with the new main railway station building expected to be completed even later. Those projections cast doubt on whether both projects could be ready if the city is awarded the 2036 Games.

The same document identifies other outstanding projects, including an extension of the U4 underground line and a tram connection to the planned Olympic Village in Daglfing, as well as the new U9 line, intended to ease pressure on public transport in the city centre. It also notes that the northern rail link, presented in the bid as a direct connection between the village and the Olympic Park, remains at the preliminary planning stage, and that there is no firm timetable for long-distance rail services to reach the airport. The lawmakers are calling on the regional government to provide a report setting out schedules, funding and measures to bring these projects forward.

Adding to these difficulties is the need to coordinate political and financial decisions, an issue also addressed in another parliamentary motion tabled last week by representatives of the Christian Social Union, the Free Voters, the Greens and the Social Democrats. The proposal called for closer cooperation between Munich's city authorities, the Bavarian government, the federal government and sporting organisations, particularly over shared financial responsibilities and the infrastructure required.

To establish which infrastructure projects could be completed by 2036, Krause ordered a review of construction timetables and said he would also need clarity on financial guarantees and the legal framework by next spring at the latest. Söder pledged that Bavaria would not leave the city to shoulder the costs alone, particularly those associated with transport infrastructure, although the amounts involved have yet to be specified. The cost of the bid itself, separate from the investment required for construction, is estimated at between €18 million and €20m, according to DPA.

To coordinate the next steps of the bid, Munich City Hall plans to establish a dedicated three-person team that will begin work in November, alongside an Olympic cabinet bringing together the municipal departments involved and a commission to involve city councillors in the process. The city also intends to establish a company to manage the bid in March 2027, provided the IOC selects it to enter a more detailed phase of talks after the contenders present their plans to the organisation's Future Host Commission in November.

The infrastructure projects planned for the bid have also drawn environmental criticism from the NOlympia campaign group, whose representative Ramona Rösch warned that the new underground lines would generate so much CO₂ that they could jeopardise Munich's goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2035, according to Bavarian public broadcaster BR24. The group also questions the impact of building the Olympic Village in Daglfing, where developing peatland and fields would, in its view, lead to an irreversible loss of natural areas.

Despite the objections, the bid secured 66.4% support in a referendum held in 2025, and Krause has promised that preparations will not lead to cuts in social or cultural spending. The project aims to reuse venues from the 1972 Games and accommodate athletes in a single Olympic Village, although the scope of the proposed legislation and the financial guarantees have yet to be finalised.

*References:

-insidethegames

[ANOC회장 선거, 2+2 합의, 법적 시험대에 직면(ANOC 2-2 Deal Faces Constitutional Test)]

10월22일자 외신기사내용 정리하여 공유합니다.

제안된 Berraf-Blanco 회장직 교대 안은 155표 확보, 엄격한 개정 시한, 그리고 자동 승계를 규정하지 않는 정관규정이라는 까다로운 법적 장벽에 직면해 있습니다(The proposed Berraf–Blanco presidential rotation faces a demanding legal hurdle: 155 votes, strict amendment deadlines and a Constitution that does not provide for automatic succession)

이는 두 후보 간의 정치적 합의가 실제 제도적 장치로 작동하려면 정관 개정과 압도적 지지 확보가 필요하다는 점을 강조하고 있는 상황입니다.

[ANOC 2+2 합의, 헌법적 시험대에 오르다]

-Mustapha Berraf(알제리)와 Alejandro Blanco(스페인)가 2026~2030년 ANOC 회장직을 2년씩 나눠 맡는 ‘2+2’ 합의 발표.

-정치적 타협으로는 의미 있지만, 정관 규정 상·제도적 실행 가능성은 불확실.

[정관규정상 장애물]

1. 155표 장벽

*ANOC 정관 제21조:

-개정안은 전체 회원국(NOC) 206개 중 최소 155개 찬성 필요

*단순 참석자 75%가 아닌 전체 회원 기준 → 매우 높은 합의 필요

2. 승계 규정 문제

1)정관 제13조: 회장 임기 4년, 사임 시 수석 부회장이 임시 회장으로 승계 후 총회에서 새 회장 선출.

2)따라서 Berraf가 2년 후 사임해도 Blanco가 자동 승계할 수 없음.

3)Blanco는 새 선거에 출마 가능하지만, 당선 보장은 없음.

3. 개정 절차와 시한

-개정안은 총회 90일 전 배포, 60일 전 대안 제출, 30일 전 의제 포함 필요.

-2026년 9월 발표 시점은 이미 12월 총회 개정안 제출 기한을 넘긴 상태

-즉, 절차적 요건 충족 여부 불투명.

[정치적 합의 vs 제도적 장치]

-단순 협력·공동 프로그램은 가능하지만, 자동 승계 보장은 헌법 개정 없이는 불가능.

-개정 없이는 사임 후 새 선거가 열리며, 결과는 불확실.

-따라서 ‘2+2’ 합의는 현재로선 정치적 의미는 크지만, 정관상으로는 미해결 상태.

[핵심 쟁점]

-개정안이 정식 제출됐는지, 기한 내 처리됐는지 불명확.

-155표 확보 가능성도 미지수.

-결국, 정치적 타협은 정관 규정을 자동으로 바꾸지 못하며, 제도적 정당성 확보가 필요.

요약하면, Berraf-Blanco의 ‘2+2 회장직 교대 합의’는 정치적 상징성은 크지만, 정관 규정 상 절차적 난관으로 인해 실제 실행 가능성은 불투명합니다.

[ANOC 2-2 Deal Faces Constitutional Test]

The proposed Berraf–Blanco presidential rotation faces a demanding legal hurdle: 155 votes, strict amendment deadlines and a Constitution that does not provide for automatic succession.

The agreement between Mustapha Berraf and Alejandro Blanco to share the ANOC presidency over the 2026–2030 term may have offered a political solution to a potentially divisive election. But turning that understanding into a workable institutional arrangement is another matter.

The proposed formula is straightforward: Berraf would serve as President from 2026 to 2028, with Blanco taking over for the remaining two years.

The difficulty is that ANOC’s current Constitution does not provide for such an arrangement.

A closer examination of its provisions raises significant questions about how the agreement could be implemented, whether a constitutional amendment would be necessary and, perhaps most importantly, whether the required support could be secured.

The 155-vote hurdle

Article 21.1(d) of the ANOC Constitution sets a particularly demanding threshold for constitutional amendments.

Any amendment must receive the affirmative votes of at least three quarters of ANOC’s total membership.

With 206 National Olympic Committees, that means a minimum of 155 affirmative votes.

The distinction matters. The requirement is not 75% of those present at the General Assembly, nor 75% of the votes cast. It is 75% of the entire membership.

Even if only 180 NOCs participated, the amendment would still require 155 votes in favour — more than 86% of those attending.

Abstentions and absences would not lower the threshold.

Securing such a majority would require exceptionally broad agreement among the NOCs. Political support for the two candidates, however substantial, would not automatically translate into support for changing the Constitution.

What happens if the President resigns?

The second obstacle lies in the Constitution’s provisions governing presidential terms and succession.

Articles 13.3 and 13.4 establish the framework for the election of the President and the four-year presidential mandate.

Article 13.9 allows an elected President to resign through written notification to the Executive Council.

But resignation does not permit the outgoing President to appoint a successor.

Article 13.10 provides that, in the event of a presidential vacancy, the Senior Vice-President assumes the presidency temporarily until the next Ordinary General Assembly, when a new President must be elected for the remainder of the term.

This has direct implications for the proposed 2+2 formula.

If Berraf were elected in December 2026 and resigned two years later, Blanco would not automatically become President simply because the two had reached a political agreement.

The constitutional succession procedure would take effect. The Senior Vice-President would assume the presidency temporarily, and a new election would follow.

Blanco could potentially stand in that election, subject to the applicable eligibility and nomination rules. But his election could not be guaranteed in advance.

In other words, a political commitment to resign after two years is not the same as a legally enforceable transfer of the presidency.

The distinction goes to the heart of the proposed agreement.

The deadline problem

Even if the two candidates and their supporters agreed that a constitutional amendment was the appropriate solution, Article 21 presents another difficulty.

The Constitution establishes specific procedures and deadlines for proposing amendments.

Under Article 21.1(a), amendments proposed by the Executive Council must be circulated to NOCs at least 90 days before an Ordinary General Assembly.

Article 21.1(b) also provides a 60-day deadline for additional or alternative proposals submitted by NOCs.

The amendment documentation must then be included with the General Assembly agenda at least 30 days before the meeting.

These requirements are not simply administrative formalities. They give member NOCs time to examine proposed changes before deciding whether to support them.

The Berraf–Blanco arrangement was publicly reported on 24 September 2026, after the 90-day deadline for Executive Council amendments ahead of the December General Assembly had already passed.

That timing does not establish that no relevant proposal was submitted earlier. But it raises an obvious question.

Was a constitutional amendment enabling the proposed presidential rotation formally submitted and circulated within the required deadlines?

No such proposal has been publicly verified in the material examined for this analysis.

If none was submitted through the prescribed procedure, introducing a new constitutional mechanism at the December General Assembly would face an additional procedural obstacle.

Article 21 also restricts the introduction of new amendments from the floor of the General Assembly, limiting the possibility of resolving the issue through an improvised last-minute proposal.

Can the agreement work without changing the Constitution?

There is an important distinction between a political understanding and a constitutional mechanism.

Berraf and Blanco may agree on a joint programme, cooperate during the presidential term or reach an understanding about a future resignation.

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None of those arrangements necessarily requires the creation of a new constitutional office or an automatic succession procedure.

But guaranteeing that one candidate will hand the presidency to the other after two years is a different proposition.

Under the existing provisions, a resignation would trigger the vacancy procedure and a subsequent election, not an automatic transfer of office.

If the intention is to establish a binding presidential rotation, a formal constitutional amendment appears to be the necessary route.

That would require a properly submitted proposal, compliance with Article 21’s deadlines and the support of at least 155 NOCs.

An alternative based on resignation and a new election might operate within the existing framework, but it would leave the outcome of that future election open.

The two mechanisms cannot be treated as equivalent.

A political agreement awaiting a constitutional solution

The proposed 2+2 arrangement has already been presented publicly as a framework for cooperation between the two presidential candidates.

Its political significance is clear. Its constitutional implementation is not.

There are now several questions that require answers.

Has a formal amendment been prepared? Was it submitted within the required timetable? Does the agreement envisage automatic succession, or merely a resignation followed by another election? And if constitutional change is necessary, can the proposal attract the affirmative votes of 155 National Olympic Committees?

These are not questions about the intentions of either candidate. They concern the rules under which ANOC elects its leadership and the authority of its General Assembly.

The Constitution provides a clear framework for presidential elections, resignations and vacancies. What it does not currently provide is a guaranteed two-year rotation between two presidential candidates.

That is the central difficulty facing the Berraf–Blanco agreement.

A political compromise may bring two candidates together. But it cannot, by itself, change the Constitution or predetermine a future election.

For the proposed 2+2 arrangement to become more than a political understanding, its supporters must demonstrate precisely how it can operate within ANOC’s constitutional framework — or secure the substantial majority required to change that framework.

Until then, the agreement remains politically significant, but its promised presidential succession remains constitutionally unresolved.

*References:

-SportsIn

-ANOC website

[IOC, 12개 분과위원회 해체: 개혁인가, 권력 집중인가? (IOC Dissolves 12 Commissions: Reform or Centralization of Power)에 대한 견해]

10월16일자 외신기가내용 정리하여 공유합니다.

IOC는 인권, 양성평등, 다양성과 포용, 올림픽 프로그램, Olympism365 등을 다루던 12개 위원회를 해체했습니다(The International Olympic Committee has dissolved 12 commissions, including those dealing with human rights, gender equality, diversity and inclusion, the Olympic programme and Olympism365)

이는 IOC가 주요 주제별 위원회를 없애고 새로운 구조로 전환하면서, 이것이 효율적 개혁인지 권력집중인지에 대한 논란이 제기되고 있다는 상황입니다.

[IOC, 12개 위원회 해체]

-IOC가 인권,·양성평등,·다양성,·포용,·올림픽 프로그램,·Olympism365 등 12개 위원회를 해체.

-대신 명확한 임무를 가진 실무그룹(Working Groups)을 중심으로 운영해 정책 수립과 의사결정을 지원하겠다고 발표.

[논란과 쟁점]

1. 행정 효율화 vs 권력 집중:

1) 실무그룹은 유연성과 효율성을 제공하지만, 지속성-·독립성-·투명성이 약화될 수 있다는 우려.

2. 기존 위원회 성과 평가 필요:

(1) 공정성-·차별 방지-·인권 보호에 기여했는지 검토해야 함.

(2) 만약 성과가 미흡했다면, 새 구조가 개선인지 단순 행정 변경인지 의문.

[미해결 과제]

1) 여성 선수 차별, 종교, 민족적 배경에 따른 참가 제한(Female athletes in some countries continue to face discrimination, while others encounter restrictions on participation because of their religious beliefs or ethnic background)

2) 히잡(Hijab) 착용 강제, 성별 검사 논란, 성별 분리 문제(Compulsory hijab, concerns about sex-testing procedures and gender segregation raise difficult questions about athletes’ rights and equal access to sport.)

3) 도핑 문제 등 여전히 해결되지 않은 과제 존재(Doping remains a separate but equally persistent challenge to sporting integrity)

[독립성과 거버넌스]

1) 실무그룹이 IOC 지도부에 불편한 질문을 제기할 수 있을지, 권한과 투명성이 보장될지 불확실.

2) IOC 거버넌스 개편, 올림픽 헌장, 국제연맹의 역할과도 연결된 논의.

3) Coventry IOC위원장이 강조한 종목 단위 중심의 프로그램 평가 방식도 권한 배분 논쟁에 포함.

[핵심 평가 기준]

1) 조직 간소화가 효율성을 높일 수 있으나, 투명성·-책임성-·선수 보호를 담보하지는 않음.

2) IOC가 단순히 대회를 조직하는 역할을 넘어, 인권·평등·책임성을 어떻게 실질적으로 보장 할지가 관건.

3) 최종적으로는 새 구조가 실제 성과를 내는지가 개혁의 진정성을 판단하는 기준이 될 것.

요약하면, IOC의 12개 기존분과위원회 해체는 행정 개혁인지 권력 집중인지 논란을 낳고 있으며, 향후 실무그룹의 독립성과 투명성·성과가 올림픽 운동의 미래를 결정할 중요한 시험대가 될 것입니다.

IOC Dissolves 12 Commissions.: Reform or Centralization of Power?

The International Olympic Committee has dissolved 12 commissions, including those dealing with human rights, gender equality, diversity and inclusion, the Olympic programme and Olympism365.

Announced on Friday, 16 October, the decision raises questions about the future of these areas within the Olympic movement and the direction of the IOC itself.

The decision should be viewed as more than an administrative change. The IOC says working groups with clearly defined mandates offer a more effective and flexible way to shape policy and support decision-making. Yet replacing permanent commissions with structures that may have more limited mandates also raises questions about continuity, independence and who ultimately determines which issues receive attention. The change comes amid wider discussions about the IOC’s governance, the Olympic Charter and the role of international sports federations.

The key question is whether the new arrangements will improve the IOC’s work or concentrate greater control over policy within its leadership.

Permanent commissions provide a structure for examining particular issues over time, while working groups can be established to address specific objectives. That flexibility may be useful, but it also makes the safeguards surrounding their mandates, membership and recommendations particularly important.

The record of the dissolved commissions deserves scrutiny as well. Their existence did not necessarily mean that they operated independently or achieved their stated objectives. Their contribution to promoting fair play, combating discrimination and protecting athletes’ human rights should be assessed alongside the IOC’s decision to replace them. If the commissions failed to address persistent problems effectively, the question is whether the new structure will offer a genuine improvement or simply a different administrative arrangement.

Many of the challenges these commissions were expected to address remain unresolved. Female athletes in some countries continue to face discrimination, while others encounter restrictions on participation because of their religious beliefs or ethnic background. Compulsory hijab, concerns about sex-testing procedures and gender segregation raise difficult questions about athletes’ rights and equal access to sport. Doping remains a separate but equally persistent challenge to sporting integrity. The extent to which the former commissions addressed these issues should form part of any assessment of their performance.

The question of independence is central to the future of the new system. Will working groups be able to scrutinise existing policies, raise uncomfortable questions and make recommendations that challenge the IOC’s leadership? What guarantees will ensure that human rights, gender equality and the fight against discrimination remain priorities when a group’s mandate ends? Without clear arrangements for transparency, continuity and accountability, the effectiveness of the new structure will be difficult to judge.

These concerns also connect the decision to the broader direction of Olympic governance. The IOC is reassessing how it organises its work and shapes the Olympic programme, while the position of international federations within the movement remains an important issue. Kirsty Coventry’s support for a discipline-based approach to the Olympic programme adds to the debate over how sporting priorities are set. Taken together, these developments raise a wider question about where authority lies within the Olympic movement and how the interests of athletes, federations and other stakeholders are represented.

A more streamlined organisation may help the IOC respond to specific challenges and manage its responsibilities more efficiently. But efficiency alone does not guarantee transparency or accountability, nor does a smaller administrative structure necessarily offer stronger protection for athletes. The central issue is how the IOC will exercise its authority and fulfil its responsibilities beyond organising the Olympic Games.

The dissolution of the 12 commissions does not, by itself, prove that the IOC intends to abandon those responsibilities. It does, however, raise questions about how they will be upheld under the new arrangements. The test will be whether the working groups can provide sustained scrutiny, address longstanding problems and ensure that human rights, equality and accountability remain integral to the Olympic movement. Ultimately, the reform should be judged not by the structure the IOC creates, but by the results it delivers.

*References:

-SportsIn

-IOC website